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Abstract
In an efficient market, spreads will reflect both the issuer’s current risk and investors’
expectations about how that risk might change over time. Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein
(2001) show analytically that a firm’s expected future leverage importantly influences the
spread on its bonds. We use capital structure theory to construct proxies for investors’
expectations about future leverage changes and find that these significantly affect bond
yields, above and beyond the effect of contemporaneous leverage. Expectations under the
trade-off, pecking order, and credit-rating theories of capital structure all receive empirical
support, suggesting that investors view them as complementary when pricing corporate
bonds.
I. Introduction
As credit-risk modeling has become more formalized, researchers have
focused increasing attention on the information content and determinants of bond
credit spreads. Financial theory indicates that a firm’s default risk should be
reflected in the value of its debt claims. Merton (1974) specifies that bond
default risk depends upon the firm’s asset volatility, its initial leverage, and the
debt’s term to maturity. Subsequent empirical studies have sought to explain credit
spreads using firm leverage and a variety of proxies for asset volatility
(e.g., Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), Krishnan, Ritchken, and
Thomson (2005), Avramov, Jostova, and Philipov (2007), and Campbell and
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Taksler (2003)). This research indicates that most of a corporate bond’s yield
spread over Treasury is due to default risk, although taxes (Elton, Gruber, Agrawal,
and Mann (2001)), liquidity (Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Chen, Lesmond,
and Wei (2007)), and systematic factors (Collin-Dufresne et al.) also seem to
contribute.
The Merton (1974) model of credit spreads assumes that a firm’s outstanding
debt remains constant until maturity. Because expected asset returns are positive,
this implies an expected decline in leverage over time, which generates relatively
low credit spreads. Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (CG) (2001) recognize that
future changes in a firm’s outstanding debt may substantially affect the riski-
ness of its multiperiod debt obligations. They model leverage as mean reverting
and simulate credit spreads that conform more closely to those observed in the
market. They conclude that “the appropriate credit spread for a corporate bond
[reflects] . . . both the firm’s current liability structure, and its right to alter this
structure in the future” (p. 1930). In other words, bond prices should reflect not
only current information about a firm’s leverage but also investors’ expectations
about future leverage.
Two studies have attempted to calibrate the theoretical CG (2001) model to
observed bond prices. First, Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004) calibrate 5 theoret-
ical models of credit spreads, including CG’s, and they confirm that a firm’s option
to adjust its capital structure can have a 1st-order impact on bond credit spreads.
However, in their implementation they adhere closely to the CG mean-reverting
model of leverage and estimate only one relatively simple specification in which
future leverage changes depend on current leverage and short-term risk-free rates.
Second, Hui, Lo, and Huang (2006) expand the CG model by assuming that lever-
age mean-reverts to a time-varying rather than constant target, and they docu-
ment that this assumption improves the model’s accuracy. Taken together, these
2 studies suggest that leverage expectations should be an important determinant
of bond credit spreads and that the model used to construct these expectations is
consequential.
In this paper, we study a quarterly sample of 394 U.S. corporations’ credit
premia for the period 1986–1998. Following CG’s (2001) intuition, we test
whether proxies for future leverage affect observed bond spreads to a statistically
and economically significant extent. Our analysis extends the previous research
in an important way by estimating leverage expectations based on alternative
theories of capital structure. This allows us to employ specific firm features to
construct proxies for investors’ expectations about the firm’s future leverage, as
opposed to the general mean-reversion models used by Eom et al. (2004) and
Hui et al. (2006). We document that changes in leverage expectations do have a
positive impact on credit-spread changes beyond the effect of contemporaneous
leverage. Indeed, the impact of expected leverage is comparable to that of contem-
poraneous leverage, with a 1-standard-deviation increase in leverage expectations
causing the issuer’s bond credit spread to widen by nearly 100 basis points (bp).
This finding is robust to alternative leverage definitions and alternative methods
of forming expectations proxies. Our study contributes to the literature’s under-
standing of what factors affect credit spreads and underscores the importance of
investors’ expectations in determining corporate bond prices.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II we develop
our main hypotheses and describe the data we use to test them. Section III
demonstrates that credit spreads reflect actual future leverage and that this effect is
as powerful as the impact of contemporaneous leverage. Section IV describes how
we form leverage expectations based on the trade-off, pecking order, and Kisgen
(2006) credit-rating theories, and incorporates those expectations into regression
models of nonfinancial firms’ credit spreads. Section V verifies the robustness of
our results. Section VI concludes.
II. Bond Credit Spreads and Corporate Leverage: Theory
In modeling a firm’s bond spread we begin with a structural model of credit
risk, derived from Black and Scholes’ (1973) and Merton’s (1974) application
of contingent-claim analysis to equity and debt valuation. In this model, a firm
defaults when its asset value falls below a default threshold, generally expressed
in terms of its outstanding debt obligations.1 Credit spreads at time t thus reflect
the latest available information about the firm’s default probability, which depends
on current leverage and investors’ expectations of future leverage. A linear version
of this relationship is
CSi, j,t = α + β · LEVj,t + γ · Et(LEVj,t+1) + θ · Zt + ωi, j,t,(1)
where
CSi, j,t is the difference between the yield to maturity on bond i of firm j and
the yield on a similar-maturity T-bond at the end of quarter t;
LEVj,t is the ratio of debt to (debt + equity) of firm j at the end of quarter t;
and
Zt is a vector of control variables motivated by structural models such as
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007).
One naturally expects that β > 0: An increase in leverage raises the probability
of default and hence the credit spread on outstanding bonds. We similarly expect
γ > 0 if investors use current information to form expectations about future
leverage.2
Some authors (e.g., Campbell and Taksler (2003)) estimate “levels” regres-
sions of the form in equation (1), but this specification may yield spurious results
if CS is not stationary (i.e., if it has a unit root). Indeed, this may be the main
reason why most of the literature (Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Krishnan et al.
(2005), and Avramov et al. (2007) among others) estimates equation (1) in the
differences. In our data set, we fail to reject the hypothesis that a bond’s CS series
has a unit root for 80% of the bonds and for the overall panel. Although we retain
1The bond spreads generated by structural credit-risk models depend on risk-neutral parameters,
while in our empirical analysis they are a function of true-probability parameters. We do not believe
that this is a serious concern, since our study is not directly calibrating or testing the CG (2001) model.
We merely use the theory developed in CG to motivate our hypotheses.
2Note that this relationship applies regardless of whether leverage is expected to change because
of firm preferences or because a bond supply effect changes expected borrowing costs (as documented
in Newman and Rierson (2004) or Dastidar (2008)).
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specification (1) as a robustness check, we employ a differences specification in
most of our analysis:
ΔCSi, j,t = β ·ΔLEVj,t + γ ·ΔEt(LEVj,t+1) + θ ·ΔZt + εi, j,t,(2)
where εi, j,t =Δωi, j,t.
First-differencing specification (1) has the added benefit of eliminating the
effect of bond-specific features on the credit spread. It also permits us to form
leverage expectations based on Kisgen’s (2006) hypothesis (applicable to leverage
changes but not leverage levels) that firms issue equity rather than debt when they
are close to a rating change. We therefore present our results for the differences
specification (2), although our conclusions about the statistical and economic sig-
nificance of expected future leverage are also strongly supported by the levels
specification (1).
Estimating specification (2) requires data on credit spreads, leverage ex-
pectations, and macroeconomic control variables. We obtain corporate bond data
from the Warga-Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database, which reports monthly
price quotes for the major corporate and government debt issues traded in the
United States. We limit our sample to coupon-paying bonds issued by U.S. in-
dustrial firms, and we eliminate bonds that are secured, those with a call or put
feature, and those backed by specific assets (such as mortgages). As in Warga
(1991) and Eom et al. (2004), we exclude bonds with less than 1 year to maturity
because they are relatively illiquid. We also omit “matrix” prices, which Sarig
and Warga (1989) find to be problematic. Finally, even though bond prices are
available from Jan. 1973 to Mar. 1998, we begin our sample in Jan. 1986 because
one of our control variables (VIX) is unavailable before that time.3
Each corporate bond’s credit spread at the end of quarter t (CSi, j,t) is defined
as the difference between its yield and the corresponding constant-maturity Trea-
sury yield, obtained from the Federal Reserve Board’s H.15 releases.4 When there
is no precise maturity match, we interpolate to obtain an appropriate Treasury
yield. We eliminate from our sample observations for which CSi, j,t is negative or
greater than 10%, as these are likely to be data entry errors or bonds in distress
(for which a linear model like specification (2) is probably inappropriate). We
define ΔCSi, j,t as the change in a bond’s credit spread over the calendar quarter
ending at t, and we winsorize this series at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
3The Warga-Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database contains about 1.5 million monthly bond
quotes for the period 1986–1998. After eliminating matrix prices and limiting our sample to corporate
issuers we are left with a third of these quotes. We also exclude bonds with embedded options (about
300,000 data points) and bonds with credit-enhancing features (about 20,000). Eliminating financial
firms and firms operating in regulated industries further reduces the number of observations by a
third. After retaining only quarter-end observations for bonds whose issuers have quarterly Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat data, we are left with about 17,000 bond-quarters.
Constructing differences and eliminating quarterly changes where comparability (e.g., because of a
merger, accounting change, etc.) is an issue further reduces our sample to about 14,000 bond-quarters.
4Our main results are essentially unchanged if we use the interest-rate swap curve instead of the
Treasury yield curve to benchmark the corporate bond yields. However, using the swap rates reduces
the number of observations because Bloomberg provides no swap rates before Nov. 1988.
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The quarterly Compustat file provides the data required to generate investor
expectations about future leverage (see Appendix). We convert nominal account-
ing values to real 1983 values using the consumer price index and mitigate the
effect of outliers by winsorizing the raw data and any resulting ratios at the 1st
and 99th percentiles.
Our initial analysis employs measures of both book leverage and market
leverage. Book leverage is defined as
BLEV = [(Long-Term Debt[51] + Short-Term Debt[45])/(3)
(Long-Term Debt[51] + Short-Term Debt[45] + Common Equity[59])],
where the numbers in brackets indicate the quarterly Compustat item numbers.
Market leverage is defined as
MLEV =
[
Market Value of Debt
Market Value of Debt + Market Value of Equity
]
.(4)
We construct 2 alternative estimates of the market value of debt.
Bharath and Shumway (2008) estimate Compustat firms’ debt market values
using a Merton-type structural model of credit risk. The market value of risky debt
is modeled as risk-free debt short a put option on the underlying market value of
the firm’s assets with a strike price equal to the face value of the firm’s debt.
Using observable firm characteristics, contingent-claim pricing implies a market
value for the firm’s equity and its debt. The leverage measure constructed from
this estimated debt market value (MLEV1) can be computed for nearly all of our
sample firms.
Our 2nd estimate of the market value of debt follows Sweeney, Warga, and
Winters (1997), who extrapolate the firm’s market value of debt from the sub-
set of outstanding bonds with quoted prices (as opposed to matrix prices) in the
Warga-Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database. At the end of each quarter we
form a portfolio of a firm’s traded bonds (i.e., bonds with trader quotes available
in the database). We then adjust the duration of this portfolio to match the duration
of all the firm’s bonds (i.e., those with trader quotes and those with matrix prices).
The market value of this portfolio represents the price per bond, and we use it as a
reasonable estimate of the market value of the firm’s long-term debt (Compustat
quarterly item 51). Short-term debt is assumed to trade at book value.5 We use
this market value of debt estimate to construct our 2nd market leverage measure
(MLEV2). It is available for fewer observations than MLEV1 because it relies on
bond price availability, while MLEV1 does not.
Macroeconomic variables included to control for nonleverage-related effects
on ΔCS (Zt in equation (1)) are taken primarily from Collin-Dufresne et al.
(2001) and Duffie et al. (2007):6
5We do not use any matrix prices in the calculation of the market value of debt because we are
interested in capturing information about firm-specific events, and this can be masked by the use of
matrix prices.
6Duffie et al. (2007) include 2 additional, firm-specific variables: RETj,t = the jth firm’s stock
return for the quarter ending at t; and DDj,t = the jth firm’s distance to default (Bharath and
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R10t = the 10-year, constant-maturity nominal T-bond rate at the end of
quarter t;
SLOPEt = the difference between the 10- and 2-year Treasury yields at the
end of quarter t;
VIXt = the implied volatility of the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 100 Index,
calculated by the Chicago Board Options Exchange on the basis of
historical data on the S&P 100 Index options;7
RS&P = the return on the S&P 500 Index for the quarter ending at t;
JUMPt = the slope of the “smirk” of implied volatilities from options on
S&P 500 Index futures, calculated as described in Collin-Dufresne
et al. (2001), using option and futures prices obtained from the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange;
CRPREMt = the difference between Moody’s average yield on Baa- and
Aaa-rated bonds, as a measure of market aversion to default risk.8
The average Treasury and corporate bond yields are obtained from the Fed-
eral Reserve Board’s H.15 releases. VIX comes from the Chicago Board Options
Exchange Web site (www.cboe.com/VIX), and RS&P comes from CRSP. Table 1
provides summary statistics for our final sample of 1,243 bonds issued by 394
U.S. industrial firms. The average number of quarterly quotes per bond is 18,
and the average number of bonds per firm is 3.9 The average credit spread is
1.06%, and the average quarterly credit-spread change is –0.01%. The average
book-valued (market-valued) leverage for our sample is 34% (33% or 31%), with
a mean quarterly change of –0.11% (–0.26% or –0.27%).
III. Credit Spreads and Realized Future Leverage
We first test whether there is a connection between spread changes and
actual future leverage innovations. Section IV then estimates equation (2) using
alternative proxies for investors’ expectations about future leverage.
Omitting future leverage changes from equation (2) results in the specifica-
tion
ΔCSi, j,t = β ·ΔLEVj,t + θ ·ΔZt + ε̃i, j,t,(5)
Shumway (2008)) for the quarter ending at t. We are reluctant to include these variables in our base
model because equity holders, like bondholders, will likely price expected-leverage changes. Adding
any firm-specific equity information might therefore disguise the effects of leverage expectation on
credit spreads. Nonetheless, including RETj,t and DDj,t in the set of explanatory variables does not
alter our findings that leverage expectations significantly affect bond spreads.
7Strictly speaking, “VIX” refers to the implied volatility of the S&P 500 Index options, but these
data are unavailable before 1990. We therefore use the implied volatility of the S&P 100 Index options
to measure market uncertainty throughout our sample period.
8Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) do not include CRPREM in their base specification, but it enters the
robustness portion of their analysis. They document that adding it to the set of explanatory variables
more than doubles the model’s adjusted R2 and reduces by half the importance of the 1st principal
component in the regression residuals.
9Bonds do not appear to be concentrated by issuer. Of the 394 firms in our sample, only 73 have
more than 4 bond issues, 58 have more than 5 bond issues, and 47 have more than 6 bond issues.
Furthermore, several bond issues of the same firm are not always outstanding at the same time.
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics on our sample of 1,243 bonds issued by 394 unique industrial firms. The sample
covers the period Jan. 1986–Mar. 1998 (when the bond-price data source ceased publishing).
Variable Definition Mean Std Dev Median Min Max
Panel A. Bond Characteristics
CS Credit spread measured as the difference 1.06 0.80 0.84 0.03 9.23
between the bond’s yield and the yield on
a Treasury with equal maturity (%)
ΔCS Change in credit spread between –0.01 0.24 –0.01 –0.89 1.01
2 consecutive quarter-ends (%)
Maturity Bond maturity in years 10.46 8.38 7.71 1.00 39.73
Duration Bond duration in years 6.05 2.97 5.75 0.95 13.35
Issue Amount Bond issue amount still outstanding 205,369 136,408 174,000 7,305 1,250,000
in $thousands
Moody’s Rating Moody’s credit rating on 7.12 2.69 7.00 1.00 18.00
an ordinal scale with 1 = Aaa
Panel B. Leverage and Leverage Expectations
BLEV Book value of debt ([51] + [45]) / 0.34 0.15 0.32 0.00 0.91
Book value of debt and equity ([51] + [45] + [59])
ΔBLEV Change in BLEV (%) –0.11 2.98 –0.23 –12.15 15.57
BLEV* Target BLEV 0.27 0.06 0.28 0.07 0.46
ΔBLEV* Change in target BLEV (%) –0.02 1.01 –0.05 –3.34 3.14
MLEV1 Market value of debt / 0.33 0.19 0.30 0.01 0.85
(Market value of debt + Market value of equity)
based on Bharath and Shumway (2008)
ΔMLEV1 Change in MLEV1 (%) –0.26 3.87 –0.36 –29.14 31.05
MLEV1* Target MLEV1 0.31 0.08 0.31 0.00 0.53
ΔMLEV1* Change in target MLEV1 (%) –0.01 2.99 –0.05 –19.81 23.63
MLEV2 Market value of debt / 0.31 0.18 0.28 0.03 0.84
(Market value of debt + Market value of equity)
based on Sweeney et al. (1997)
ΔMLEV2 Change in MLEV2 (%) –0.27 3.85 –0.36 –23.39 44.94
MLEV2* Target MLEV2 0.28 0.07 0.28 0.00 0.49
ΔMLEV2* Change in target MLEV2 (%) –0.09 2.93 –0.12 –18.39 17.46
EtFINDEFA Expected FINDEFA 0.01 0.03 0.00 –0.12 0.21
ΔEtFINDEFA Change in expected FINDEFA (%) –0.07 2.54 –0.06 –9.09 8.71
CRPOM An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s 0.63 0.48 1.00 0.00 1.00
credit rating was plus or minus, and 0 otherwise
Panel C. Firm Characteristics
FINDEFA Financing deficit / Total assets [44] 0.01 0.05 0.00 –0.18 0.30
EBIT TA Earnings before interest and taxes ([8] + [22] + [6]) / 0.02 0.02 0.02 –0.06 0.10
Total assets [44]
MB Book value of debt plus market value of equity 1.23 0.61 1.08 0.32 4.42
([51] + [45] + [55] + [14] × [61]) /
Book value of total assets [44]
DEP TA Depreciation [5] / Total assets [44] 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04
lnTA Log of total assets [44], measured in 1983 dollars 22.44 1.14 22.51 18.48 24.73
FA TA Property, plant, and equipment [42] / Total assets [44] 0.41 0.22 0.38 0.01 0.89
R&D TA R&D expenses [4] / Total assets [44] 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03
R&D DUM An indicator variable equal to 1 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
if a firm did not report R&D expenses,
and 0 otherwise
RATED An indicator variable equal to 1 0.99 0.12 1.00 0.00 1.00
if the firm has a public debt rating in Compustat,
and 0 otherwise
IND MED Prior quarter’s median leverage ratio 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.05 0.59
for the firm’s industry. Industries defined
according to Fama and French (1997)
MVE ($M) Market value of equity 12,034 17,131 5,098 23 85,086
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Summary Statistics
Variable Definition Mean Std Dev Median Min Max
Panel D. Macro Variables Measuring Bond Market Conditions
ΔR10 Change in the spot rate measured as –0.04 0.52 –0.02 –1.89 1.36
the 10-year Treasury yield
ΔSLOPE Change in the slope of the yield curve measured –0.05 0.27 –0.06 –0.85 0.68
as the difference between
the 10- and 2-year Treasury yields
RS&P Quarterly S&P 500 Index return 0.03 0.05 0.04 –0.30 0.20
ΔVIX Change in the implied volatility of the S&P 500 Index 0.29 3.83 0.02 –25.86 44.96
ΔJUMP Change in the slope of the “smirk” of implied 0.02 1.21 0.12 –5.89 6.78
volatilities of options on S&P 500 Index futures
ΔCRPREM Change in the credit-risk premium measured as –0.01 0.10 0.00 –0.33 0.32
the difference between the yields on Aaa- and
Baa-rated bonds
where ε̃i, j,t = γ ·ΔEt (LEVj,t+1) + εi, j,t. The coefficient on ΔEt(LEVj,t+1) might
be different from 0 for either of two reasons. First, our hypothesis that a change
in expected future leverage affects contemporaneous credit spreads implies that
γ > 0. If investors’ expectations are rational, a positive residual in specification
(5) should tend to be followed by higher leverage, and a negative residual should
be followed by lower leverage. An alternative hypothesis reverses this proposed
causation: A reduction (increase) in credit spreads encourages the firm to seek
more (less) debt financing because debt has become relatively cheap (expensive).
In this case, γ should be negative, so positive (negative) residuals should be fol-
lowed by lower (higher) leverage.
Table 2 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (5) for
book leverage (BLEV) and both market leverage measures (MLEV1 and MLEV2).
All 3 contemporaneous leverage measures significantly affect a firm’s credit
spread. The signs on the control variables’ coefficients are consistent with theory.
We therefore feel comfortable using the residuals from these estimations to sep-
arate observations into one group with positive residuals and another group with
negative residuals. Table 3 examines how these residuals are related to subsequent
leverage changes.10
Panel A of Table 3 tests whether subsequent leverage changes are the same
for firms with positive versus negative residuals from equation (5). We reject
this hypothesis for leverage changes up to 4 quarters ahead, based on both a
t-test of mean leverage changes and a nonparametric (Wilcoxon) test of median
changes.11 Positive regression residuals are followed by significantly higher
10An alternative way to evaluate the effect of future leverage is to add future values of leverage as
additional explanatory variables in equation (5). See column 1 of Table 4.
11After rejecting the hypothesis that the 2 residual groups have equal variances, we use an appro-
priate t-test.
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TABLE 2
Credit-Spread Changes and Contemporaneous Leverage Changes
In Table 2, results are from an OLS estimation of the following model on the sample of 1,243 bonds over the 1986–1998
period:
(5) ΔCSi,j,t = β ·ΔLEVj,t + θ ·ΔZt + ε̃i,j,t.
Here,ΔCS= change in bond credit spreads;ΔLEV= change in book (BLEV) or market (MLEV1, MLEV2) leverage ratio;
ΔZ includes the following structural-model motivated variables: ΔR= change in the spot rate measured by the 10-year
Treasury yield; ΔSLOPE = change in the slope of the yield curve measured as the difference between 10- and 2-year
Treasury yields; ΔVIX = change in the implied volatility on the S&P 500 Index; S&P = quarterly S&P 500 Index return;
ΔJUMP= change in the slope of the “smirk” of implied volatilities of options on S&P 500 Index futures; and ΔCRPREM=
change in the spread between the yield on Aaa- and Baa-rated bonds. Changes are measured over consecutive quarters.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by
***, **, and *, respectively.
Leverage Measure
BLEV MLEV1 MLEV2
ΔLEVt 0.386*** 1.017*** 0.846***
(0.068) (0.075) (0.084)
ΔR10t –0.098*** –0.096*** –0.091***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
(ΔR10t )
2 0.096*** 0.099*** 0.112***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
ΔSLOPEt –0.117*** –0.115*** –0.114***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
ΔVIXt 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
RS&Pt –0.077 0.050 –0.050
(0.062) (0.059) (0.064)
ΔJUMPt 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.025***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ΔCRPREMt 0.389*** 0.369*** 0.285***
(0.020) (0.027) (0.031)
Intercept –0.048*** –0.046*** –0.053***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
No. of obs. 13,764 13,693 10,122
Adj. R2 0.11 0.13 0.12
leverage changes, and vice versa. These findings are robust to the inclusion of
bond or firm fixed effects in regression (5) (not tabulated). The significantly posi-
tive relationship between these residuals and subsequent leverage changes implies
that leverage expectations are the dominant influence on a firm’s credit spread. In
other words, credit spreads reflect (rather than cause) future leverage changes.
We further examine the residuals from regression (5) to determine which
specific components of future leverage are reflected in current bond prices. We
rewrite the general definition of market-valued leverage (4) as
MLEV =
[
Dpd
Dpd + Sps
]
,(6)
where
D is the nominal value of outstanding debt,
S is the number of outstanding shares,
pd is the market price of a $1 bond, and
ps is the market price of a share of stock.
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TABLE 3
Credit-Spread Changes and Realized Future Leverage Changes
Panel A of Table 3 presents tests that evaluate the hypothesis that firms with positive residuals from the OLS estimation in
Table 2 experience larger k-period-ahead increases in leverage than do firms with negative residuals. Here, ΔLEVNegi,[t,t+k]
andΔLEVPosi,[t,t+k] are the k-quarter-ahead changes in leverage for firms with negative and positive residuals, respectively.
Panel B presents test statistics for the hypotheses that subsequent changes in each of the 4 components of leverage
changes are the same for firms with positive versus negative residuals from the OLS estimation of equation (5). Here,
Δ1LEV and Δ3LEV are the leverage changes through debt issuances/repayments and equity issuances/repurchases,
respectively; Δ2LEV and Δ4LEV are the leverage changes through debt price changes and equity price changes, re-
spectively. The t-tests with the assumption of unequal variances test whether the means of the 2 residual groups are equal
(against the alternative that the difference between them is strictly positive), and nonparametric Wilcoxon median tests
assess whether the medians of the 2 residual groups are equal (against the alternative that they are different). Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Panel A. Future Leverage Changes
Nobs, Nobs,
Null Hypothesis ΔLEVPosi,[t,t+k] ΔLEV
Neg
i,[t,t+k] Mean Median
Book Leverage (BLEV)
ΔLEVPosi,[t,t+1] −ΔLEVNegi,[t,t+1] 6,867 6,858 0.36%*** 0.18%***
ΔLEVPosi,[t,t+2] −ΔLEVNegi,[t,t+2] 6,831 6,819 0.49%*** 0.32%***
ΔLEVPosi,[t,t+3] −ΔLEVNegi,[t,t+3] 6,778 6,785 0.60%*** 0.34%***
ΔLEVPosi,[t,t+4] −ΔLEVNegi,[t,t+4] 6,739 6,736 0.70%*** 0.46%***
Market Leverage (MLEV1)
ΔLEVPosi,[t,t+1] −ΔLEVNegi,[t,t+1] 6,897 6,759 0.11%** 0.02%*
ΔLEVPosi,[t,t+2] −ΔLEVNegi,[t,t+2] 6,856 6,688 0.23%*** 0.45%***
ΔLEVPosi,[t,t+3] −ΔLEVNegi,[t,t+3] 6,783 6,669 0.36%*** 0.46%***
ΔLEVPosi,[t,t+4] −ΔLEVNegi,[t,t+4] 6,741 6,606 0.44%*** 0.54%***
Market Leverage (MLEV2)
ΔLEVPosi,[t,t+1] −ΔLEVNegi,[t,t+1] 4,925 5,104 0.40%*** 0.27%***
ΔLEVPosi,[t,t+2] −ΔLEVNegi,[t,t+2] 4,624 4,843 0.43%*** 0.42%***
ΔLEVPosi,[t,t+3] −ΔLEVNegi,[t,t+3] 4,421 4,552 0.60%*** 0.25%***
ΔLEVPosi,[t,t+4] −ΔLEVNegi,[t,t+4] 4,324 4,195 0.63%*** 0.55%***
Panel B. Future Leverage Change Decomposition
Δ1LEV =
[
Spspd
(Dpd + Sps)2
]
ΔD Δ2LEV =
[
DSps
(Dpd + Sps)2
]
Δpd
Δ3LEV =
[ −Dpspd
(Dpd + Sps)2
]
ΔS Δ4LEV =
[ −DSpd
(Dpd + Sps)2
]
Δps
Nobs, Nobs,
Null Hypothesis ΔLEVPosi,[t,t+k] ΔLEV
Neg
i,[t,t+k] Mean Median
Book Leverage (BLEV)
Δ1LEVPosi,[t,t+1] −Δ1LEVNegi,[t,t+1] 6,859 6,850 0.51%** 0.02%***
Δ3LEVPosi,[t,t+1] −Δ3LEVNegi,[t,t+1] 6,859 6,850 0.44%*** 0.06%***
Market Leverage (MLEV1)
Δ1LEVPosi,[t,t+1] −Δ1LEVNegi,[t,t+1] 6,848 6,750 0.12%*** 0.09%***
Δ2LEVPosi,[t,t+1] −Δ2LEVNegi,[t,t+1] 6,848 6,750 0.06% 0.00%
Δ3LEVPosi,[t,t+1] −Δ3LEVNegi,[t,t+1] 6,848 6,750 0.12%*** 0.03%***
Δ4LEVPosi,[t,t+1] −Δ4LEVNegi,[t,t+1] 6,848 6,750 0.01% 0.02%
Market Leverage (MLEV2)
Δ1LEVPosi,[t,t+1] −Δ1LEVNegi,[t,t+1] 4,873 5,061 0.17%*** 0.02%*
Δ2LEVPosi,[t,t+1] −Δ2LEVNegi,[t,t+1] 4,873 5,061 0.00% 0.01%
Δ3LEVPosi,[t,t+1] −Δ3LEVNegi,[t,t+1] 4,873 5,061 0.21%*** 0.04%***
Δ4LEVPosi,[t,t+1] −Δ4LEVNegi,[t,t+1] 4,873 5,061 0.01% 0.05%
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Leverage is affected by a change in the quantity or price of either debt or equity
outstanding.12 That is,
ΔMLEV =
[
SpspdΔD + SpsDΔpd − DpspdΔS− DpdSΔps
(Dpd + Sps)
2
]
(7)
≡ Δ1 +Δ2 +Δ3 +Δ4,
where
Δ1 = the change in leverage due to a change in outstanding debt,
Δ2 = the change in leverage due to a change in the price of debt,
Δ3 = the change in leverage due to a change in outstanding shares, and
Δ4 = the change in leverage due to a change in share price.13
Note that for quarterly changes in book leverage (BLEV) Δ2=Δ4= 0.
Since market efficiency implies that investors should be unable to forecast
bond or share price movements, we do not expect bond yield spreads to be affected
by price-driven changes in future leverage. Rather, the future leverage changes
anticipated by investors should reflect only Δ1 and Δ3, the components under
management’s direct control. Consistent with the hypothesis of market efficiency,
Panel B of Table 3 indicates that the residuals from equation (5) predict only
the components of leverage changes due to changes in bonds or shares issued.
Regardless of the leverage measure used (market vs. book-valued), both a t-test
of means and a nonparametric (Wilcoxon) test of medians reject the hypothesis
that Δ1 and Δ3 are the same following firm-quarter observations with positive
versus negative residuals from equation (5). By contrast, the mean and median
leverage changes due to price fluctuations, Δ2 and Δ4, never differ between the
2 groups.14 These findings suggest that book leverage might be a more appropriate
basis for constructing measures of leverage expectations. We therefore present
most of our remaining analysis using book-valued leverage ratios, although results
are consistent when using MLEV1 and MLEV2 (not tabulated).
IV. Credit Spreads and Expected Future Leverage
Given that subsequent leverage changes affect credit spreads, one naturally
wonders how investors form expectations about these leverage changes. Fortu-
nately, the corporate finance literature provides several theories of leverage choice.
We construct estimates of investors’ future leverage expectations under the trade-
off, pecking order, and credit-ratings-based (Kisgen (2006)) hypotheses of capital
structure. These estimates are explained and derived in the Appendix, and their
summary statistics are included in Table 1. Briefly, the 3 expected future leverage
estimates are
12We thank the referee for pointing out this distinction among the components of leverage change.
13The change in the value of equity as a result of market-price changes is calculated as the differ-
ence between the market-value change and the book-value change in common stock. The change in
the value of debt due to changes in yields is similarly defined.
14This pattern occurs up to 3 quarters into the future, although only the 1st quarter’s results are
tabulated in Panel B of Table 3.
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ΔEt(BLEV
∗
j,t+1) = the change in firm j’s expected target leverage during
the quarter ending at t + 1, conditional on information available at
the end of quarter t. The target leverage ratio (BLEV∗) is computed
from a partial adjustment model estimated via generalized method of
moments (GMM), as described in the Appendix. Under the trade-off
theory, firms currently operating below their leverage target would
prefer to issue debt rather than equity in an attempt to reach their
optimal leverage level.
ΔEt(FINDEFAj,t+1) = the change in firm j’s expected financing deficit in
quarter t + 1, conditional on information available at the end of quarter
t. The pecking order hypothesis predicts that firms generally prefer to
issue debt rather than equity when they need to raise external capital.
Therefore, a positive expected financing deficit implies an expected
increase in leverage, and vice versa.
CRPOMj,t = 1 when firm j’s credit rating in quarter t includes a plus or
minus, and 0 otherwise. For example, CRPOM = 1 for firms rated
A+ or A−, but not A. Kisgen (2006) argues that firms with “minus”
ratings wish to avoid falling to the next lower letter category, and
firms with “plus” ratings generally wish to raise themselves to the next
higher letter category. He shows that firms with a plus or minus credit
rating are less likely to issue debt (relative to equity) for at least a
year.
These theories of leverage choice are not mutually exclusive. For instance,
Et(BLEV
∗
j,t+1) might be describing investors’ expectations about a firm’s long-
term leverage target, while ΔEt(FINDEFAj,t+1) might imply a temporary lever-
age change. This is why we examine the effect of the above expected-leverage
proxies on bond credit spreads both individually and jointly.
Table 4 presents results from adding 1 or more leverage-expectation prox-
ies into the base regression (2). Column 1 uses 4 subsequent, actual leverage
changes as a “perfect foresight” set of expectations. Columns 2–5 report results
based on 1 or more of our 3 theory-based expectations. As predicted by theory
and confirmed by previous empirical studies, contemporaneous leverage is posi-
tively related to credit spreads, and this effect appears to be economically large.
A 1-standard-deviation change (2.98%) in book leverage (ΔBLEV) causes a
78–137 bp change in bond credit spreads across the 5 specifications. This is a
large economic effect, since the standard deviation of spreads is 80 bp (Table 1).
Beyond the impact of contemporaneous leverage on credit spreads, 3 of 4 real-
ized future leverage changes in column 1 carry significantly positive coefficients,
consistent with the results in Table 3.
The expected-leverage proxies also carry statistically and economically sig-
nificant coefficients. In column 2 of Table 4, the effect of target leverage appears
comparable to that of contemporaneous leverage: A 1-standard-deviation change
(1.01%) in target leverage (BLEV∗) causes a 100-bp change in bond spreads.
Column 3 presents similar results when investor expectations are represented by
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TABLE 4
Credit-Spread Changes and Expected-Leverage Changes
These are the results from an OLS estimation of the following model on the sample of 1,243 bonds from 1986 to 1998:
(2) ΔCSi,j,t = β ·ΔLEVj,t + γ ·ΔEt(LEVj,t+1) + θ ·ΔZt + εi,j,t.
Here, ΔCS = change in bond credit spreads; ΔLEV = change in the book leverage ratio, BLEV; ΔE(LEV) is al-
ternatively proxied by ΔE(BLEV*); ΔE(FINDEFA), and CRPOM; ΔE(BLEV*) = change in target leverage ratio; target
BLEV is the fitted value from a Blundell-Bond (1998) GMM estimation of equation (A-3); ΔE(FINDEFA) = change in ex-
pected financing deficit scaled by total assets; expected FINDEFA is the fitted value from an OLS estimation of equation
(A-7) (specification (1) in Table A2); CRPOM = 1 for plus/minus credit ratings, and 0 otherwise; and ΔkLEVt is the
k-quarter-ahead change in leverage. Estimated coefficients on the macroeconomic control variables (Zt) closely resem-
ble those in Table 2 and are omitted here to save space. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Our main
results are not changed by using boot-strapped standard errors or standard errors adjusted for bond or firm clustering.
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. F is the F-statistic testing
the hypothesis that the coefficients on all 3 ΔE(LEV) proxies are jointly 0 (df = 3, [nobs − ncoeff]).
1 2 3 4 5
ΔBLEVt 0.460*** 0.336*** 0.308*** 0.383*** 0.262***
(0.087) (0.086) (0.089) (0.083) (0.090)
ΔEt(BLEV∗t+1) 0.990*** 0.994***
(0.222) (0.222)
ΔEt(FINDEFAt+1) 0.369*** 0.389***
(0.098) (0.098)
CRPOMt –0.018*** –0.017***
(0.004) (0.004)
Δ1LEVt 0.595***
(0.079)
Δ2LEVt 0.172**
(0.082)
Δ3LEVt 0.327***
(0.085)
Δ4LEVt 0.070
(0.087)
No. of obs. 13,461 13,434 13,764 13,747 13,418
Adj. R2 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
F 18.19***
the “pecking order” proxy. The estimated coefficient on expected financing deficit
is highly significant and indicates a large economic impact: The spread changes
94 bp for a 1-standard-deviation change in ΔEt(FINDEFAj,t+1). Kisgen’s (2006)
CRPOM indicator also carries a significant coefficient (in column 4), with the
expected negative sign: Firms with “plus or minus” credit ratings are considered
less likely to issue debt in the near future. When all 3 proxy variables are included
in the same regressions (column 5 of Table 4), their estimated coefficients remain
significant and close to their values in the preceding 3 columns. Thus, each proxy
adds some information to the other two. The same conclusions hold for market-
valued leverage (results not tabulated).
Since all proxies carry a significant coefficient of the expected sign, Table 4
provides little basis for separating one theory of leverage determination from an-
other. However, the capital structure literature argues that different theories may
describe different types of firms. Under the trade-off theory of capital structure,
firms compare the bankruptcy costs of debt to its tax-shield benefits in select-
ing an optimal leverage ratio. Therefore, leverage targets might be more infor-
mative about future leverage for firms more likely to incur these costs or more
likely to value these benefits. According to the pecking order theory, financing
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decisions are guided by the existence of asymmetric information costs, which
are likely to be higher for equity issuances than for debt issuances. This implies
that for firms facing low asymmetric information costs, pecking order considera-
tions might be less relevant in forming expectations about future leverage changes.
Finally, Lemmon and Zender (2010) argue that firms subject to high default risk
might be limited in their ability to borrow funds despite their preference for debt
over equity financing. These debt-capacity-constrained firms might deviate from
the predictions of the pecking order theory, making their financing deficit a less
relevant basis for predicting future leverage.
We investigate whether firm characteristics proxying for bankruptcy costs,
tax-shield benefits, asymmetric information, and debt-capacity constraints affect
the sensitivity of bond credit spreads to the 3 proxies for expected future leverage.
Table 5 reports the results from reestimating the main model (2) for subsets of
firms grouped according to their leverage, size, profitability, and credit rating.15
The estimations use book leverage (BLEV defined in equation (3)) and include
all the control variables from regression (2). To save space, we do not report the
estimated coefficients on these control variables.
The 1st noteworthy point in Table 5 is that the leverage proxies significantly
affect contemporaneous credit spreads for nearly all subsamples. For only 1 of the
11 subsamples (the largest size tercile, column 6) do we fail to reject the hypothe-
sis that our 3 leverage proxies significantly affect credit spreads. In 8 subsamples
we reject this joint hypothesis at the 1% confidence level, while in the other two
we reject it at the 5% and 10% levels. In contrast, 4 of the 11 subsamples yield
insignificant coefficients on contemporaneous leverage, though all four have the
correct sign. This confirms that expected future leverage is at least as important
as contemporaneous leverage in determining bond spreads.
The individual proxies tend to be significant in Table 5 for the types of
firms for which they are expected to be most relevant. The “trade-off” proxy for
future leverage carries a significant coefficient in 9 subsamples, and the relative
size of the coefficients seems intuitively reasonable. For example, the coeffi-
cient for high-leverage firms exceeds the coefficient for low leverage, low prof-
itability exceeds high profitability, and junk (far) exceeds investment grade. The
“pecking order” proxy is significant in 6 of the 11 subsamples, frequently when
informational asymmetries might be higher (small and medium-size firms, and
low-profitability firms). The CRPOM proxy is significantly negative in 7 sub-
samples. We observe insignificant CRPOM coefficients for the high-leverage,
large, and high-profitability groups. Surprisingly, the junk bond subsample has
an insignificant coefficient on CRPOM, although the point estimate in this case is
quite large.
15Leverage subsets are formed based on lagged leverage terciles. Size subsets are formed based on
each firm’s lagged market capitalization rank relative to that of all NYSE firms. Small firms have mar-
ket value of equity below the median of NYSE firms, medium-size firms fall in the 50–85 percentile
range, and large firms have market value of equity higher than 85% of NYSE firms. Credit-rating
groups are based on the firm’s S&P Issuer Credit Rating. Profitability subsets are formed based on
lagged pretax earnings-to-sales terciles.
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TABLE 5
Expected-Leverage Changes Effects by Various Firm Characteristics
These are the results from an OLS estimation of the following model on the sample of 1,243 bonds from 1986 to 1998:
(2) ΔCSi,j,t = β ·ΔLEVj,t + γ ·ΔEt(LEVj,t+1) + θ ·ΔZt + εi,j,t.
Here,ΔCS= change in bond credit spreads;ΔLEV= change in the book leverage ratio, BLEV;ΔE(LEV) is jointly proxied byΔE(BLEV*),ΔE(FINDEFA), and CRPOM;ΔE(BLEV*)= change in target leverage
ratio; target BLEV is the fitted value from a Blundell-Bond (1998) GMM estimation of equation (A-3); ΔE(FINDEFA) = change in expected financing deficit scaled by total assets; expected FINDEFA is the fitted
value from an OLS estimation of equation (A-7) (specification (1) in Table A2); CRPOM = 1 for plus/minus credit ratings, and 0 otherwise; and ΔZ includes macroeconomic control variables defined in Table
1. The coefficients on the macroeconomic control variables are not reported to save space and to focus attention on the variables of primary interest. Changes are measured over consecutive quarters. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. F is the F-statistic testing that the coefficients on all 3ΔE(LEV) proxies
are jointly 0 (df = 3, [nobs − ncoeff]). Firms are divided into groups based on: i) Lagged leverage terciles: Low-leverage firms have lagged book leverage of less than 0.28; medium-leverage firms have lagged
book leverage in the 0.28–0.38 range; and high-leverage firms have lagged book leverage higher than 0.38. ii) Lagged size: Size groups are based on market capitalization ranking in each quarter relative to the
universe of NYSE firms. Small firms have market value of equity lower than that of the median NYSE firm; medium-size firms have equity values in the 50–85 percentile range; and large firms have equity values
higher than 85% of NYSE firms. iii) Lagged profitability: Firms in the lowest tercile have EBIT/Sales ratio in the –32% to 3% range; moderately profitable firms fall in the 3%–6% range, and the most profitable firms
fall in the 6%–25% range. iv) Lagged S&P Issuer Credit Ratings: investment grade (BBB– and higher) versus junk-rated issuers.
Credit-Rating
Leverage Terciles Size Groups Profitability Terciles Groups
Low Medium High Small Medium Large Low Medium High Invest Junk
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
ΔBLEVt 0.174* 0.131 0.579*** 0.518** 0.070 0.293** 0.281 0.401*** 0.462*** 0.115 1.074**
(0.095) (0.154) (0.194) (0.219) (0.170) (0.138) (0.183) (0.126) (0.174) (0.079) (0.459)
ΔEt(BLEV∗t+1) 0.814*** 0.571 1.805*** 0.861** 1.504*** 0.758** 1.791*** –0.223 1.054** 0.541*** 4.392***
(0.288) (0.349) (0.502) (0.434) (0.478) (0.380) (0.529) (0.325) (0.428) (0.191) (1.248)
ΔEt(FINDEFAt+1) 0.122 0.878*** 0.198 0.377** 0.512** 0.144 0.494** 0.155 –0.056 0.408*** 0.744*
(0.104) (0.163) (0.194) (0.164) (0.207) (0.157) (0.213) (0.134) (0.278) (0.089) (0.415)
CRPOMt –0.012** –0.024*** –0.012 –0.044*** –0.023*** –0.000 –0.037*** –0.011** –0.008 –0.008** –0.063
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.044)
No. of obs. 4,448 4,520 4,416 3,394 3,666 6,358 4,104 4,153 4,118 12,233 1,185
Adj. R2 0.09 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.14
F 5.00*** 15.19*** 5.55*** 11.14*** 7.21*** 1.67 10.09*** 2.01* 2.64** 11.35*** 5.39***
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V. Robustness
The results presented so far support our hypothesis that bond investors price
their expectations of a firm’s future financing choices. In this section, we investi-
gate the robustness of our results along several dimensions: 3 alternatives to the
model specification (2), different expectations for future leverage, asymmetric
effects of expected-leverage increases versus decreases, and adding other firm
characteristics that have been found to predict firm defaults. In all robustness
tests, our proxies for future leverage continue to carry positive and significant
coefficients.
A. Modeling Credit-Spread Levels
Although we present our main results using 1st-differenced regression speci-
fications, other authors have estimated a levels model like equation (1). We present
results from this specification in Table 6. In addition to the control variables
(Zt) in equation (2), the regressions in Table 6 include the square of the term
structure SLOPE variable and a set of bond fixed effects. We cannot include
the credit-ratings-based leverage expectation CRPOM because Kisgen’s (2006)
logic makes predictions about leverage changes, but not about leverage levels.
Still, contemporaneous leverage in Table 6 has significantly positive coefficients,
as do the trade-off and pecking order proxies for expected future leverage. As
in Table 4, expected future leverage has a larger effect on credit spreads than
does contemporaneous leverage. We conclude that the regression specification
we select does not affect our conclusions about the relevance of expected future
leverage.
TABLE 6
Credit Spreads and Expected Leverage
These are the results from an OLS estimation of the following model on the sample of 1,243 bonds from 1986 to 1998:
(1) CSi,j,t = α + β · LEVj,t + γ · Et(LEVj,t+1) + θ · Zt + ωi,j,t.
Here, CS = bond credit spreads; LEV = the book leverage ratio, BLEV; E(LEV) is alternatively proxied by E(BLEV*)
and E(FINDEFA); E(BLEV*) = target leverage ratio; target BLEV is the fitted value from a Blundell-Bond (1998) GMM
estimation of equation (A-3); E(FINDEFA) = expected financing deficit scaled by total assets; expected FINDEFA is the
fitted value from an OLS estimation of equation (A-7) (specification (1) in Table A2); and Z includes the structural-model
motivated variables listed in the notes to Table 2 plus the square of the term structure SLOPE and bond fixed effects. These
coefficients are not reported to save space and to focus attention on the variables of primary interest. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *,
respectively.
1 2 3 4
BLEVt 1.796*** 1.682*** 1.766*** 1.667***
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Et(BLEV∗t+1) 2.074*** 2.046***
(0.096) (0.097)
Et(FINDEFAt+1) 0.839*** 0.445**
(0.189) (0.188)
No. of obs. 14,861 14,575 14,861 14,575
Adj. R2 0.179 0.207 0.181 0.207
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B. Explaining Returns Rather Than Yield Changes
New information about leverage probably changes the price of a longer-
term bond more substantially than that of a short-term bond. Our use of the
simple credit-spread change ignores the bond’s duration and hence might impose
an unwarranted structure when we estimate our main model across bonds with
various maturities. We therefore replaced the dependent variable in equation (2)
with the bond’s quarterly holding period return, which incorporates the effect
of the bond’s duration. Recall that, in discrete time, a bond’s rate of return can
be approximated by the (negative) product of its modified duration and its yield
change: ΔP/P = −DM ·ΔYTM, where P is the bond’s price, DM is its modified
duration, and YTM is its yield to maturity. We focus on yield-to-maturity changes
that result from changes in the credit-risk profile of the issuing firm, which allows
us to rewrite equation (2) as16
DMi, j,t ·ΔCSi, j,t = β ·ΔLEVj,t + γ ·ΔEt(LEVj,t+1) + θ ·ΔZt + εReti, j,t.(8)
Expectations of future leverage under the trade-off, pecking order, and credit-
rating-based theories are as defined earlier. The results from estimating
equation (8) (not reported) do not alter our earlier conclusions. The credit portion
of a bond’s holding-period return responds to expected changes in future leverage
just as much as the bond’s credit-spread change does. Both target leverage and
expected financing deficit changes remain significant, supporting our hypothesis
that leverage expectations are an important consideration in bond pricing.
C. Nonlinear Specification
Structural models of credit risk predict that leverage changes should affect
credit spreads nonlinearly, which our main specification (2) overlooks. Modeling
credit spreads as a nonlinear function of both current and future leverage trans-
forms equation (1) into
CSi, j,t = β · LEVj,t + β′ · [LEVj,t]2 + γ · Et(LEVj,t+1)(9)
+ γ′ · [Et(LEVj,t+1)]2 + θ · Zt + ωNLi, j,t.
Rewriting this as a difference equation yields
ΔCSi, j,t = β ·ΔLEVj,t + β′ · (LEV2j,t − LEV2j,t−1)(10)
+ γ · [Et(LEVj,t+1)− Et−1(LEVj,t)]
+ γ ′ · {[Et(LEVj,t+1)]2 − [Et−1(LEVj,t)]2} + θ ·ΔZt + εNLi, j,t,
where εNLi, j,t = Δω
NL
i, j,t. This nonlinear specification adds the squared values of
leverage, target leverage, and expected financing deficit to our base model,
equation (2). The only leverage expectation proxy that we cannot effectively
square is CRPOM, so we retain it in our model as is.
16This is analogous to focusing on the credit-risk component of bond returns. Note that an alterna-
tive path to equation (8) is an assumption of no change in the risk-free rate.
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The estimation results (not reported here) indicate that the relationship be-
tween changes in credit spreads and changes in leverage is nonlinear in the trade-
off proxy but not in the pecking order proxy. The squared target leverage term is
positive and statistically significant. However, allowing for this nonlinearity does
not alter our earlier conclusion(s) that expected leverage affects contemporaneous
credit spreads.
D. Alternative Targets
Our trade-off proxy for expected leverage relies on a single set of target
estimates, derived from the regressions in Table A1 in the Appendix. We also
estimated models using a 1- or 3-year trailing average of past leverage to proxy
for a firm’s leverage target. These alternative proxies for future leverage carry even
larger coefficients than those reported in Table 4, indicating that our conclusions
are robust to using simpler procedures for leverage-target estimation.
E. Asymmetric Response to Expected-Leverage Increases versus
Decreases
The specification in Tables 4 and 5 constrains firms to have a symmetri-
cal response to future leverage changes, whether intending to raise or lower their
leverage ratios. However, it may be systematically easier for firms to increase their
debt level than to decrease it, or vice versa. If investors recognize this asymmetry
in future financing behavior, then we should observe quantitatively different reac-
tions to expected-leverage increases versus decreases. To investigate these issues,
we revise our main specification (2) to permit asymmetric investor responses to
anticipated leverage changes:
ΔCSi, j,t = β ·ΔLEVj,t + γ ·ΔEt(LEVj,t+1)(11)
+ γ ′ ·ΔEt(LEVj,t+1) · EXP DECRj,t+1
+ γ ′′ ·ΔEt(LEVj,t+1) · EXP INCRj,t+1 + θ ·ΔZt + εAsymi, j,t ,
where EXP DECR (EXP INCR) is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the firm
is expected to have lower (higher) leverage in the future. We construct measures
of EXP DECR and EXP INCR based on each of the capital structure theories we
have been considering. For the trade-off hypothesis, EXP DECR (EXP INCR)
equals unity when a firm’s (LEV∗j,t+1 − LEVj,t) is in the bottom (top) tercile for a
given quarter. For the pecking order hypothesis, EXP DECR (EXP INCR) equals
unity when a firm’s Et(FINDEFAj,t+1) is in the bottom (top) tercile for a given
quarter.
In an estimation of equation (11) (results not tabulated), the coefficients on
the trade-off proxies weakly suggest ( p = 0.098) that firms above their targets
are expected to adjust more slowly than firms below their targets. The estimated
coefficients on the pecking order proxies indicate statistically and economically
similar ( p = 0.505) effects of expected future leverage on credit spreads. For
either sort of asymmetry, the coefficients on current leverage (ΔLEVt) remain
very close to those reported in Table 4. We conclude that our findings are not sys-
tematically different for firms expected to increase versus decrease their leverage.
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F. Adding Accounting Measures as Explanatory Variables
Previous research shows that accounting variables forecast a firm’s default
probability (see Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), Zmijewski (1984), Shumway
(2001), Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundsted (2004), Beaver, McNichols, and
Rhie (2005), and Das, Hanouna, and Sarin (2009)), but the exact nexus remains
unknown. Our study raises the possibility that accounting variables may forecast
default because they proxy for expected future financing decisions. To investigate
whether this conjecture has any empirical validity, we replace expected future
leverage in equation (5) with a set of accounting variables (Aj,t) to get
ΔCSi, j,t = β ·ΔLEVj,t + τ ·ΔAj,t + θ ·ΔZt + εAccti, j,t .(12)
The vector Aj,t includes various combinations of variables that have been used
as default predictors by previous researchers:
O-SCORE = a default probability score based on Ohlson (1980),
Z-SCORE = a default probability score based on Altman (1968),
NI GROWTH = change in net income scaled by total assets,
IC = interest coverage ratio,
QR = quick ratio,
CASH = cash availability,
TRADE = trading account activities (inventories / cost of goods sold),
SL GROWTH = change in sales scaled by lagged sales.
After estimating equation (12), we investigate the effect of adding future leverage
changes to the set of explanatory variables.
Regardless of the combination of accounting variables used, our future lever-
age proxies are always strongly significant (results not tabulated). Furthermore,
adding future leverage proxies to equation (12) reduces the size and often the sta-
tistical significance of the accounting predictors of default. This is consistent with
the possibility that these variables predict default probability in part because they
predict subsequent leverage changes.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrate that credit spreads reflect future changes in
a firm’s actual leverage, consistent with the theoretical work of CG (2001). The
effect of future leverage is large, generally exceeding the effect of contempora-
neous leverage. This relation naturally raises the question of how investors form
expectations about a firm’s future leverage. To investigate, we construct 3 proxies
for leverage changes, based on 3 theoretical perspectives on firm capital struc-
ture. One proxy relies on the trade-off theory, another relies on the pecking order
theory, and the 3rd derives from Kisgen’s (2006) hypothesis that firms enjoy dis-
crete benefits from moving to a higher (letter) credit rating. We use all 3 proxies
for investors’ leverage expectations to explain credit-spread changes in a sample
of 1,243 bonds over the period 1986–1998.
Our analysis contributes 3 important empirical findings. First, we show that
bondholders predict future leverage changes resulting from changes in outstand-
ing debt and equity, but not from fluctuations in stock or bond prices. This negative
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conclusion about future price changes encourages us to believe that credit spreads
actually reflect anticipated changes in leverage. Although credit spreads could
be either positively or negatively related to future leverage, our results indicate
a strong positive relation. That is, high contemporaneous credit spreads seem
to reflect expected increases in future leverage. The alternative possibility
(that unusually high spreads cause lower leverage by discouraging borrowing)
is inconsistent with the data.
Second, we confirm that investors’ expectations about future leverage
changes significantly affect credit spreads and that this effect is above and beyond
(and often larger than) the effect of contemporaneous leverage changes. Since
most previous studies on the determinants of credit spreads and credit-spread
changes have focused on a firm’s current financial state (e.g., Collin-Dufresne
et al. (2001), Krishnan et al. (2005), Avramov et al. (2007), Campbell and Taksler
(2003), and Chen et al. (2007)), our analysis adds to the literature about the factors
affecting bond prices.
Finally, our analysis provides some evidence on the extent to which investors
act in accordance with the various theories of capital structure. In the overall
sample, the trade-off, pecking order, and credit-rating theories all yield signifi-
cant proxies for expected future leverage. Bond investors find these 3 indicators
to be complementary and use all of them when forming expectations about the
average firm’s future leverage. However, estimating our model for firm subgroups
(based on leverage, size, profitability, and credit rating) indicates that the trade-off
proxy for future leverage is more robust than the other two. While all 3 theories
of capital structure receive some empirical support, the trade-off theory seems the
most broadly applicable.
Appendix. Proxies for Expected Future Leverage
Our analysis requires proxies for investors’ expectations of future leverage. We rely
on 3 such proxies, based on i) the trade-off and ii) pecking order theories of capital
structure and iii) Kisgen’s (2006) hypothesis that firms prefer higher debt ratings rather
than a specific leverage ratio. These determinants of future leverage are not mutually
exclusive.
1. The Trade-Off Hypothesis
The trade-off theory of capital structure maintains that firms select a value-
maximizing leverage ratio by trading off the costs and benefits of debt. Firms move toward
this optimal leverage target gradually, perhaps reflecting positive adjustment costs (Fischer,
Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), Leary and Roberts (2005)):
LEVj,t+1 − LEVj,t = λ
(
LEV∗j,t+1 − LEVj,t
)
+ δ̃j,t+1,(A-1)
where
LEVj,t is the jth firm’s observed leverage at the end of quarter t,
LEV∗j,t+1 is the jth firm’s target leverage for the end of quarter t + 1, and
λ is the quarterly adjustment speed.
Equation (A-1) thus implies that investors should expect higher (lower) future leverage
when the firm’s leverage is below (above) its target.
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Previous researchers have estimated models that permit target leverage to vary across
firms and over time:
LEV∗j,t+1 = βXj,t,(A-2)
where Xj,t is a vector of the jth firm’s characteristics designed to capture the costs and
benefits of debt. We use the following such characteristics:
EBIT TA = earnings before interest and taxes as a proportion of total assets,
MB = the ratio of assets’ market-to-book values,
DEP TA = depreciation expense as a proportion of total assets,
lnTA = log of total book assets (a measure of firm size),
FA TA = fixed assets as a proportion of total assets,
R&D DUM = a dummy variable equal to 1 if research and development (R&D)
expenditures are not reported, and 0 otherwise,
R&D TA = research and development expenses as a proportion of total assets,
RATED= a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a debt rating, and 0 otherwise,
IND MED = the prior quarter’s median leverage ratio for the firm’s industry, where
industry classifications are based on the 48 industry categories in Fama and
French (1997), and
Firm fixed effects (Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender
(2008)).
Panel C of Table 1 provides summary statistics for these variables.
Substituting equation (A-2) into equation (A-1) produces the estimable model
LEVj,t+1 = λ(βXj,t) + (1− λ)LEVj,t + δ̃j,t+1.(A-3)
We estimate equation (A-3) via Blundell and Bond’s (1998) GMM system using 1973–
2006 data for our sample firms. The results are presented in column 1 of Table A1. The
model fits the data well, and the estimated quarterly adjustment speed (8.2%) implies an
average annual adjustment speed (29%) close to other estimates in the literature (Leary
and Roberts (2005), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and
Smith (2012), and Lemmon et al. (2008)). Explanatory variables carry appropriate signs,
comparable with those reported in previous studies.17 The results reported in Tables 4–6
treat the fitted values from this Blundell-Bond (1998) estimation as our 1st proxy for ex-
pected future leverage.18 We check robustness by estimating a target from each of the
2 alternative specifications of equation (A-3). Column 2 of Table A1 includes firm fixed
effects and constrains λ = 1, while column 3 ignores the data’s panel nature and reports
OLS estimates. The main conclusions are robust to using any of these 3 target estimates.
We first test whether these leverage targets capture investors’ expectations in a mean-
ingful way. Every quarter we calculate each firm’s distance from its target leverage as
[Et(LEV
∗
t+1) − LEVt] and classify it as below target (if the distance is positive) or above
target (if the distance is negative). If our targets are indeed meaningful, we should ob-
serve that below-target firms increase their leverage in the future and above-target firms
decrease it. Consistent with this conjecture, mean leverage change is significantly negative
17Estimating equation (A-3) for a market-valued leverage definition yields similar results to the
ones shown in Table A1.
18In an attempt to remove seasonal variation from our leverage estimates, we include quarterly
dummy variables when estimating equation (A-3) and then omit the quarterly effects when computing
target leverage ratios. This adjustment has virtually no effect on the estimates or tests reported in the
paper.
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TABLE A1
Estimation of Target Leverage
This is an estimation of the following model on the quarterly accounting data for the 394 bond issuers in our sample from
1973 to 2006:
(A-3) LEVj,t+1 = λ(βXj,t) + (1− λ)LEVj,t + δ̃j,t+1.
LEV is a leverage ratio, X is a vector of firm characteristics, which includes the following variables: EBIT TA is earnings
before interest and taxes scaled by total assets, MB is the ratio of market-to-book value of assets, DEP TA is depreciation
expense to total assets, lnTA is the natural log of total assets, FA TA is the ratio of fixed-to-total assets, R&D DUM is an
indicator variable for whether the firm reports an R&D expenditure or not, R&D TA is R&D expenditures scaled by total
assets, RATED is an indicator for whether the firm has rated debt, and IND MED is the median leverage for each firm’s
industry. Column 1 is a Blundell-Bond (1998) GMM estimation of the model. Column 2 is a panel estimation under the
assumption of full adjustment toward the target every period (i.e., λ= 1). Column 3 is an OLS estimation under the partial-
adjustment assumption. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
GMM FE λ = 1 OLS
1 2 3
LEVt 0.918*** 0.962***
(0.003) (0.003)
EBIT TAt –0.093*** –0.803*** –0.073***
(0.014) (0.032) (0.017)
MBt 0.001** –0.009*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
DEP TAt –0.027 –0.373*** 0.039
(0.056) (0.128) (0.044)
lnTAt –0.001*** 0.002** –0.001***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
FA TAt 0.016*** 0.056*** 0.004***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.002)
R&D DUMt 0.001 0.006*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
R&D TAt 0.045 –0.963*** –0.122**
(0.078) (0.178) (0.048)
RATEDt 0.006*** 0.046*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
IND MEDt –0.004 0.438*** 0.005
(0.005) (0.010) (0.004)
Intercept 0.039*** 0.104*** 0.020***
(0.011) (0.024) (0.005)
Quarter dummies Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes No
No. of obs. 32,962 33,259 32,962
Adj. R2 0.93 0.23 0.93
(positive) up to 4 quarters into the future for firms currently above (below) their leverage
target (results not tabulated).
2. The Pecking Order Hypothesis
The pecking order theory of capital structure is based on the presumption that trans-
action costs (in particular, the asymmetric information component of those costs) are higher
for equity issuances than bond issuances. Thus, firms tend to issue debt (rather than equity)
when they need to raise external funds. Conversely, firms with excess internally gener-
ated funds tend to retire debt in order to preserve their options to borrow again (Lemmon
and Zender (2010)). Therefore, an anticipated financing deficit (surplus) should be associ-
ated with higher (lower) future leverage (Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Lemmon and
Zender (2010)). Following Shyam-Sunder and Myers, we define a firm’s net need to raise
external funds as its “financing deficit”:
FINDEFAj,t = (DIVj,t + Ij,t +ΔWj,t − Cj,t)/Assetsj,t,(A-4)
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where
DIVj,t is the jth firm’s cash dividends paid during the quarter ending at t,
Ij,t is the jth firm’s net investments during the quarter ending at t,
ΔWj,t is the jth firm’s change in working capital during the quarter ending at t,
Cj,t is the jth firm’s net cash flow after interest and taxes during quarter t, and
Assetsj,t is the book value of the jth firm’s assets at the end of quarter t.19
Shyam-Sunder and Myers specify that the pecking order hypothesis should result in lever-
age changes following the pattern20
LEVj,t+1 − LEVj,t = FINDEFAj,t+1 + δj,t+1.(A-5)
Under the pecking order theory, expected future leverage follows from a simple rearrange-
ment of equation (A-5):
Et(LEVj,t+1) = Et(FINDEFAj,t+1) + LEVj,t.(A-6)
Unlike the trade-off hypothesis, the prior literature provides little guidance about
predicting FINDEFA. We therefore specify a parsimonious model of the form
FINDEFAj,t+1 = φYj,t + υj,t+1,(A-7)
whereYj,t is a vector of firm j’s characteristics at the end of quarter t. We experiment with
various such characteristics but ultimately limit the set to those that appear statistically
most important:
FINDEFAj,t−k+1, (k = 1 to 4) = up to 4 lags of the dependent variable defined pre-
viously,
IND DUMj,t = an industry dummy based on the 48 industries defined in Fama and
French (1997), and
EBIT TAj,t = earnings before interest and taxes as a proportion of total assets.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table A2 indicate that the 1st lag of FINDEFA has the strongest
explanatory power in equation (A-7), and that adding further lags or other accounting vari-
ables does not improve the model’s fit from an adjusted R2= 0.38 (we report only a subset
of all our estimation results).
We experiment with alternative estimation techniques as well. Column 3 of Table
A2 incorporates the data’s panel characteristics by adding firm fixed effects to control
for unobserved variables that are relatively stable over time for each firm. However, the
dynamic panel specification in column 3 might provide biased coefficient estimates on
the lagged dependent variable. We reestimate this regression, substituting an instrumental
variable for FINDEFAt−1, and then we report the results in column 4 of Table A2. This
correction does not materially affect the model’s fit or estimated coefficients. Therefore,
we use fitted values from the specification in column 1 as our pecking-order-based proxy
for expected future leverage.21
19Investment (Ij,t) is defined by the following Compustat Quarterly data items: [91 − 85 − 109 +
90 − 83 + 94 − 110] for format code 7, and [91 − 85 + 90 − 83 + 94 + 95] for format codes 1–3.
Change in working capital (ΔWj,t) is defined by the following Compustat Quarterly data items: [74−
103− 104− 105− 106− 107− 75− 112] for format code 7, [74 + 75 + 73] for format code 1, and
[74− 75− 73] for format codes 2 and 3. Net cash flow after interest and taxes (Cj,t) is defined by the
following Compustat Quarterly data items: [76 + 77 + 78 + 79 + 80 + 102 + 81 + 114] for format code
7 and [76 + 77 + 78 + 79 + 80 + 102 + 81 + 87] for format codes 1–3.
20Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find support for this version of the pecking order hypothesis,
although Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2003) do not.
21We adjust our estimates of expected financing deficit for seasonality in the same manner in which
we adjust our leverage targets. We start by estimating equation (A-7) with quarterly dummy variables
and then calculate fitted values, excluding the dummy variables.
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TABLE A2
Estimation of Expected Financing Deficit
This is an estimation of the following model on the quarterly accounting data for the 394 bond issuers in our sample from
1973 to 2006:
(A-7) FINDEFAj,t+1 = φYj,t + υj,t+1.
FINDEFA is a measure of financing deficit scaled by total assets; Y is a vector of firm characteristics, which includes the
following variables in addition to lags of FINDEFA: EBIT TA is EBIT as a proportion of total assets and industry dummies
based on the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry categorizations. Columns 1 and 2 of Table A2 are OLS estimations of the
model. Column 3 is a panel estimation that includes firm fixed effects. Column 4 is a dynamic panel estimation with firm
fixed effects where the 2nd lag of FINDEFA is used as an instrument for the 1st lag. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
OLS OLS Panel IV
1 2 3 4
FINDEFAt 0.594*** 0.602*** 0.556*** 0.510***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
FINDEFAt−1 –0.018
(0.011)
FINDEFAt−2 –0.032***
(0.010)
FINDEFAt−3 0.098***
(0.009)
EBIT TAt –0.032* –0.025 0.023 0.010
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.017)
Intercept 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No No Yes Yes
No. of obs. 25,069 26,426 26,426 25,968
Adj. R2 0.38 0.38 0.32 0.38
As with the leverage targets, we examine whether our expected FINDEFA values
capture investors’ expectations of future leverage changes. In every quarter during the
sample period we use the fitted value from equation (A-7) to separate firms into those
expected to run a financing deficit and those expected to run a surplus. The mean future
leverage change is negative for all firms up to 4 quarters into the future. This probably re-
flects positive retained earnings. However, the subsequent leverage increases significantly
over the next 4 quarters for firms with negative predicted FINDEFA, which the pecking
order would predict to be financing themselves with debt (pr = 0.10 for tests of mean
differences and pr = 0.05 for tests of median differences, not tabulated).
3. The Credit-Rating-Based Hypothesis
Kisgen (2006) hypothesizes that credit ratings affect firms’ leverage decisions, per-
haps in addition to either trade-off or pecking order considerations. He argues that there
are distinct advantages to a higher letter grade. Consequently, firms close to the next higher
rating (e.g., BBB+ is close to A–) prefer to avoid issuing new debt. Firms close to a lower
rating (e.g., A– relative to A) also avoid debt issuance to preserve their current letter grade.
Kisgen confirms that firms with a “plus or minus” credit rating (CRPOM = 1) more fre-
quently choose equity over debt financing, ceteris paribus.
Given the simplicity of capturing this insight, we include CRPOM as one of our
proxies for expected changes in future leverage. Our findings are generally consistent with
those in Kisgen (2006). All firms with a credit rating manifest a decline in leverage over
the subsequent 4 quarters, but firms with CRPOM= 1 have a significantly larger (pr= 0.1)
leverage decline. We conclude that a firm’s proximity to a letter-rating change constitutes
a meaningful proxy for leverage expectations.
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